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Abstract
Classifiers such as deep neural networks have been
shown to be vulnerable against adversarial perturbations
on problems with high-dimensional input space. While ad-
versarial training improves the robustness of image classi-
fiers against such adversarial perturbations, it leaves them
sensitive to perturbations on a non-negligible fraction of the
inputs. In this work, we show that adversarial training is
more effective in preventing universal perturbations, where
the same perturbation needs to fool a classifier on many
inputs. Moreover, we investigate the trade-off between ro-
bustness against universal perturbations and performance
on unperturbed data and propose an extension of adver-
sarial training that handles this trade-off more gracefully.
We present results for image classification and semantic
segmentation to showcase that universal perturbations that
fool a model hardened with adversarial training become
clearly perceptible and show patterns of the target scene.
1. Introduction
While deep learning is relatively robust to random noise
[11], it can be easily fooled by adversarial perturbations
[44]. These perturbations are generated by adversarial at-
tacks [15, 31, 5] that generate perturbed versions of the in-
put which are misclassified by a classifier and remain quasi-
imperceptible for humans. There have been different ap-
proaches for explaining properties of adversarial examples
and provide rationale for their existence in the first place
[15, 45, 12, 13]. Moreover, these perturbations have been
shown to be relatively robust against various kinds of im-
age transformations and are even successful when placed as
artifacts in the physical world [21, 43, 10, 4]. Thus, adver-
sarial perturbations might pose a safety and security risk for
Clean image Adv.image undefended model Adv.image defended model
Figure 1. Effectiveness of shared adversarial training against uni-
versal perturbations: the top row shows an ImageNet example
and the bottom row an example from Cityscapes. Adversarial im-
ages perturbed by universal perturbations generated for both the
undefended models and models defended by our proposed method
shared adversarial training are shown. The classification accu-
racy of the defended models deteriorates no more than 5% but ro-
bustness to universal adversarial attacks increases by 3x and 5x
on image classification and semantic segmentation, respectively.
Moreover, universal perturbations become clearly perceptible.
autonomous systems and also reduce trust on the models
that are in principle vulnerable to these perturbations.
Several methods have been proposed for increasing the
robustness of deep networks against adversarial examples,
such as adversarial training [15, 22], virtual adversarial
training [28], ensemble adversarial training [46], defensive
distillation [36, 35], stability training [50], robust optimiza-
tion [25], Parseval networks [7] and alternatively detecting
and rejecting them as malicious [26]. While some of these
approaches improve robustness against adversarial exam-
ples to some extent, the classifier remains vulnerable against
adversarial perturbations on a non-negligible fraction of the
inputs for all defenses [3, 47].
Most work has focused on increasing robustness in im-
age classification tasks, where the adversary can choose a
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data-dependent perturbation for each input. This setting is
very much in favor of the adversary since the adversary
can craft a high-dimensional perturbation “just” to fool a
model on a single input. In this work, we argue that lim-
ited success in increasing the robustness under these condi-
tions does not necessarily imply that robustness can not be
achieved in other settings. Specifically, we focus on robust-
ness against input-agnostic perturbations, namely universal
perturbations [29], where the same perturbation needs to
fool a classifier on many inputs. Moreover, we investigate
robustness against such perturbations in dense prediction
tasks such as semantic image segmentation, where a per-
turbation needs to fool a model on many decisions, e.g.,
the pixel-wise classifications. Data-dependent adversarial
attacks need to know their input in advance and require on-
line computation to generate perturbations for every incom-
ing input whereas universal attacks work on unseen inputs.
Prior work has shown that standard models are vulnera-
ble to both universal perturbations, which mislead a classi-
fier on the majority of the inputs [29, 32], and to adversarial
perturbations on semantic segmentation tasks [14, 48, 6].
The study of robustness against universal perturbations
is important since they pose a realistic threat-model for cer-
tain physical-world attacks: for instance, Li et al. [23] show
that an adversary could mount a semi-transparent adversar-
ial sticker on a physical camera which effectively adds a
universal perturbation to each unseen camera image. It was
demonstrated by Metzen et al. [27] that such universal per-
turbations can hide nearby pedestrians in semantic segmen-
tation which may allow deceiving an emergency braking
system and would also pose a threat in surveillance scenar-
ios. However, these and similar results have been achieved
for undefended models. In this work, we focus on the case
where models have been “hardened” by a defense mecha-
nism, particularly adversarial training. While this technique
can considerably increase robustness, there is an implicit
trade-off between robustness against perturbations and high
performance on unperturbed inputs. We show that explic-
itly tailoring adversarial training for universal perturbations
allows handling this trade-off more gracefully.
Our main contributions are as follows: (1) We propose
shared adversarial training, an extension of adversarial
training that handles the inherent trade-off between accu-
racy on clean examples and robustness against universal
perturbations more gracefully. (2) We evaluate our method
on CIFAR10, a subset of ImageNet (with 200 classes), and
Cityscapes to demonstrate that universal perturbations for
the defended models become clearly perceptible as shown
in Figure 1. (3) We are the first to scale defenses based
on adversarial training to semantic segmentation. (4) We
demonstrate empirically on CIFAR10 that the proposed
technique outperforms other defense mechanisms [30, 37]
in terms of robustness against universal perturbations.
2. Related Work
In this section, we review related work on the study of
universal perturbations and adversarial perturbations for se-
mantic image segmentation.
2.1. Universal Perturbations
Different methods for generating universal perturbations
exist: Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [29] uses an extension of the
DeepFool adversary [31] to generate perturbations that fool
a classifier on a maximum number of inputs from a train-
ing set. Metzen et al. [27] proposed a similar extension of
the basic iterative adversary [22] for generating universal
perturbations for semantic image segmentation. In contrast
to former works, Mopuri et al. [33] proposed Fast Feature
Fool, a data-independent approach for generating universal
perturbations. In follow-up work [32], they show similar
fooling rates of data-independent approaches as have been
achieved by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [29]. Khrulkov and
Oseledets [19] show a connection between universal pertur-
bations and singular vectors. In another line of work, Hayes
and Danezis [16], Mopuri et al. [40], and Poursaeed et al.
[38] proposed generative models that can be trained to gen-
erate a diverse set of (universal) perturbations.
An analysis of universal perturbation and their proper-
ties is provided by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [30]. They con-
nect the robustness to universal perturbations with the ge-
ometry of the decision boundary and prove the existence of
small universal perturbation provided the decision bound-
ary is systematically positively curved. Jetley et al. [18]
build upon this work and provide evidence that directions
in which a classifier is vulnerable to universal perturbations
coincide with directions important for correct prediction on
unperturbed data. They follow that predictive power and
adversarial vulnerability are closely intertwined.
Prior procedures on robustness against universal pertur-
bations define a distribution over (approximately optimal)
such perturbations for a model (either by precomputing and
random sampling [29], by learning a generative model [16],
or by collecting an increasing set of universal perturba-
tions for model checkpoints during training [37]), fine-tune
model parameters to become robust against this distribution
of perturbations, and (optionally) iterate. These procedures
increase robustness against universal perturbations slightly,
however, not to a satisfying level. This is probably caused
by the model overfitting to the fixed distribution of univer-
sal perturbations that do not change during the optimiza-
tion process. However, re-computing universal perturba-
tions in every mini-batch anew is prohibitively expensive.
In this work, we propose a method that can be performed
efficiently by computing shared perturbations on each mini-
batch and using them in adversarial training, i.e., the shared
perturbations are computed on-the-fly rather than precom-
puted as in prior work [29, 37]. Concurrent to our work,
Shafahi et al.[42] recently proposed “universal adversarial
training” where updates of the neural network’s parameters
and the universal perturbation happen concurrently. This re-
duces the overhead of determining a universal perturbation
anew for every mini-batch; however, it is unclear if such an
incrementally updated universal perturbation can track the
changes of the network’s weights sufficiently.
Alternative defense approaches add additional compo-
nents to the model: Ruan and Dai [41] proposed to identify
and reject universal perturbations by adding shadow classi-
fiers, while Akhtar et al. [1] proposed to prepend a subnet-
work in front of the model that is used to compensate for the
added universal perturbation by detecting and rectifying the
perturbation. Both methods have the disadvantage that the
model becomes large and thus inference more costly. More
severely, it is assumed that the adversary is not aware of
the defense mechanism and it is unclear if a more powerful
adversary could not fool the defense mechanism.
2.2. Adversarial Perturbations for Semantic Image
Segmentation
Methods for generating adversarial perturbations have
been extended to structured and dense prediction tasks like
semantic segmentation and object detection [14, 48, 6].
Metzen et al. [27] even showed the existence of universal
perturbations which result in an arbitrary target segmenta-
tion of the scene which has nothing in common with the
scene a human perceives. A comparison of the robust-
ness of different network architectures has been conducted
by Arnab et al. [2]: they found that residual connections
and multiscale processing actually increase robustness of an
architecture, while mean-field inference for Dense Condi-
tional Random Fields only masks gradient but does not in-
crease robustness itself. In contrast to their work, we focus
on modifying the training procedure for increasing robust-
ness. Both approaches could be combined in the future.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce basic terms and notations
relevant for this work. We aim to defend against an adver-
sary under white-box attack settings. Please refer to Section
A.1 in the supplementary material for details on capabilities
of the adversary and the threat model.
3.1. Risks
Let L be a loss function (categorical crossentropy
throughout this work), D be a data distribution, and θ be
the parameters of a parametric model fθ. Here, we define
the risk ρ(θ) as the expected loss of the model fθ for a data
distribution. The following risks are relevant for this work
(we extend the definitions of Uesato et al. [47]):
1. Expected Risk: ρexp(θ) = E(x,y)∼D L(θ, x, y)
2. Adversarial Risk:
ρadv(θ,S) = E(x,y)∼D
[
sup
ξ(x)∈S
L(θ, x+ ξ(x), y)
]
3. Universal Adversarial Risk:
ρuni(θ,S) = sup
ξ∈S
E(x,y)∼D [L(θ, x+ ξ, y)]
Here, ξ(x) denotes an adversarial perturbation, ξ a uni-
versal perturbation, and x + ξ(x) an adversarial example.
The set S defines the space from which perturbations may
be chosen. We would like to note that adversarial and uni-
versal risk are not equivalent since in the former case, ξ(x)
depends on the specific x sampled from D, while the latter,
ξ needs to generalize over the entire data distribution D.
3.2. Adversaries
Since the worst-case perturbation ξ(x) cannot be com-
puted efficiently in typical settings, one needs to resort to
an adversary which aims at finding a strong perturbation
ξ(x). Note that this corresponds to searching for a tight
lower bound of ρadv . We define an adversary as a function
fadv : D × Θ 7→ S , which maps a data point and model
parameters θ onto a perturbation ξ(x) that maximizes a loss
Ladv(θ, x+ξ(x), y)
1. While different options for the adver-
saries fadv exist [15, 31, 5, 29, 32], we focus on projected
gradient descent (PGD) [25, 21], as it provides in our ex-
perience a good trade-off between being computationally
efficient and powerful. PGD initializes ξ(0) uniformly at
random in S (or subset of S) and performs K iterations of
the following update:
ξ(k+1) = ΠS
[
ξ(k) + αk · sgn(∇xLadv(θ, x+ ξ(k), y)
]
,
where ΠS denotes a projection on the space S and αk
denotes a step-size. Similarly, a targeted attack where the
model shall output the target class yt can be obtained by
setting αk to −αk and y to yt.
Similar to a standard adversary, we define a univer-
sal adversary denoted by funi as function mapping model
parameters θ onto perturbation ξ with the objective of
maximizing E(x,y)∼D [Ladv(θ, x+ ξ, y)]. One can mod-
ify PGD into a universal adversary by using the loss
Luni(θ, {xi, yi}mi=1, ξ) = 1m
∑m
i=1 Ladv(θ, xi + ξ, yi). If
the number of data points m is large (which is typically
required for finding universal perturbations that generalize
well to unseen data), one can employ stochastic PGD, where
in every iteration k, a set of m˜k data points is sampled and
Luni is only evaluated on this subset of data points.
4. Shared Adversarial Training
We connect the above risks to show that adversarial train-
ing optimizes a loose upper bound on the universal risk and
1We note that one may choose Ladv = L or one may also choose, e.g.,
L to be the 0-1 loss and Ladv be a differentiable surrogate loss.
motivate shared adversarial training, an extension of adver-
sarial training that aims at maximizing robustness against
universal perturbations. We show that this method mini-
mizes an upper bound on the universal risk which is tighter
than the one used in adversarial training.
4.1. Relationship between Risks
We show the following inequalities for the
risks:ρexp(θ) ≤ ρuni(θ,S) ≤ ρadv(θ,S) ∀θ ∀S ⊃ {0}.
To see the validity of these inequalities, we set S = {0}
to obtain ρuni(θ,S) = ρexp(θ) (and S ⊃ {0} can only
increase ρuni(θ,S)). For the second inequality, assume
ρadv < ρuni. Let ξ be one of the multiple universal
perturbations that maximize ρuni. Since ξ is an element of
S, we could certainly set ξ(x) = ξ ∀x in the definition of
the adversarial risk. This would result in ρadv = ρuni. This
completes the proof by contradiction, and thus ρadv can
only be larger than or equal to ρuni in general.
The objective of adversarial training is defined as mini-
mizing the loss function σ · ρadv(θ,S) + (1− σ) · ρexp(θ),
where σ controls the trade-off between robustness and per-
formance on unperturbed inputs. We note that if one is in-
terested in minimizing the universal adversarial risk ρuni,
then using ρadv in adversarial training with σ = 1 cor-
responds to minimizing an upper bound of ρuni because
ρuni(θ,S) ≤ ρadv(θ,S), provided that the adversaries find
perturbations that are sufficiently close to the optimal per-
turbations. On the other hand, standard empirical risk min-
imization ERM (σ = 0), which minimizes the empirical
estimate of ρexp, corresponds to minimizing a lower bound.
As shown in previous work [15, 31, 5], this does confer
only little robustness against (universal) perturbations. For
0 < σ < 1, adversarial training corresponds to minimiz-
ing a convex combination of the upper bound ρadv and the
lower bound ρexp but does not directly optimize on ρuni.
As we show in Section 6, this standard version of adversar-
ial training already provides strong robustness against uni-
versal perturbations at the cost of reducing performance on
unperturbed data considerably.
4.2. Method
Directly employing ρuni in adversarial training is infea-
sible since evaluating ρuni(θ,S) with an adversary funi in
every mini-batch is prohibitively expensive (because it re-
quires large m). Hence, it would be desirable to use an up-
per bound of ρuni in adversarial training that is tighter than
ρadv but cheaper to approximate than ρuni.
For this, we propose to use a so-called heap adversary,
which we define as a function fheap : Dm × Θ 7→ S
that maps a set of m data points and model parameters θ
onto a perturbation ξ. We use Luni(θ, {xi, yi}mi=1, ξ) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 Ladv(θ, xi+ξ, yi) as loss function for the heap ad-
versary. However, in contrast to a universal adversary, we
do not require a heap adversary to find perturbations that
generalize to unseen data. This allows choosing m rela-
tively small.
More specifically, we split a mini-batch consisting of d
data points into d/s heaps (subsets of the mini-batch) of
size s (we denote s as sharedness). Rather than using the
adversary fadv for computing a perturbation on each of
the d data points separately, we employ a heap adversary
fheap for computing d/s shared perturbations on the
heaps with m = s. Thereupon, these perturbations are
broadcasted to all d data points by repeating each of the
shared perturbations s times for all elements of the heap.
Employing this heap adversary implies a risk ρ(s)heap. We
propose to use ρ(s)heap in adversarial training when aiming
at defending against universal perturbations and denote the
resulting procedure as shared adversarial training. This
entire process is illustrated in Figure 2. We can obtain the
following relationship for s = 2i (please refer to Section
A.2 for more details):
ρadv = ρ
(1)
heap ≥ ρ(2)heap ≥ ρ(4)heap ≥ · · · ≥ ρ(d)heap ≥ ρuni(σ,S)
Note that while all ρ(s)heap are upper bounds on the univer-
sal risk ρuni, this does not imply that shared perturbations
are strong universal perturbations. In contrast, the smaller s,
the more “overfit” are the shared perturbations to the respec-
tive heap. However, ρ(s)heap with s  1 is typically a much
tighter upper bound on ρuni than ρadv and can be approxi-
mated as efficiently as ρadv: for this, PGD is converted into
a heap adversary by replacing Ladv with Luni. By appro-
priately reshaping and broadcasting perturbations, we can
compute d/s shared perturbations on the respective heaps
of the mini-batch jointly by PGD with essentially the same
cost as computing d adversarial perturbations with PGD.
4.3. Adversarial Loss Function
We recall that Luni(θ, {xi, yi}mi=1, ξ) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 Ladv(θ, xi + ξ, yi). Because of limited capacity
of the perturbation (ξ ∈ S), there is “competition” between
m data points: the maximizers of Ladv(θ, xi + ξ, yi)
will typically be different and the data points will “pull”
ξ into different directions. Hence, using the categorical
cross-entropy as a proxy for the 0-1 loss is problematic for
untargeted adversaries: since we are maximizing the loss
and the categorical cross-entropy has no upper bound, there
is a winner-takes-all tendency where the perturbation is
chosen such that it leads to highly confident misclassifica-
tions on some data points and to correct classification on
other data points (this incurs higher cost than misclassifying
more data points but with lower confidence).
To prevent this, we employ loss thresholding on the
categorical cross-entropy L to enforce an upper bound on
Ladv: Ladv(θ, x, y) = min(L(θ, x, y), κ). We used κ =
Figure 2. A pictorial representation of shared adversarial training. We split the mini-batch of d images into d/s heaps each with sharedness
s and obtain the gradients of the loss with respect to the inputs. Here, the sharedness s corresponds to the number of inputs that are used
for the generation of a shared perturbation. The gradients in each heap of size s are then processed and multiplied with step-size αk to
create a shared perturbation that is further broadcasted to size of the heap. The generated shared perturbations are aggregated and clipped
after every iteration in order to confine the perturbations within a predefined magnitude ε. These perturbations are added to the images and
this process is repeated iteratively. The adversarial inputs generated from the shared perturbations are used for adversarial training.
− log 0.2, which corresponds to not encouraging the adver-
sary to reduce confidence of the correct class below 0.2. A
similar loss thresholding was also proposed by Shafahi et
al. [42] concurrently. Besides, we also incorporate label
smoothing and use the soft targets for the computation of
loss in all our experiments.
5. Robustness Evaluation
In this section, we define the measure of robustness used
in the experiments and detail how we approximate it.
5.1. Definition of Robustness
For the special case of the 0-1 loss, an n-dimensional in-
put x, and S = S(ε) = [−ε, ε]n, we define the adversarial
robustness as the smallest perturbation magnitude ε that re-
sults in an adversarial risk (misclassification rate) of at least
δ. More formally:
εadv(δ) = arg min
ε
ρadv(θ,S()) s.t. ρadv(θ,S()) > δ.
In other words, there are perturbations ξ(x) with
||ξ(x)||∞ < εadv(δ) that result in a misclassification rate
of at least δ. Analogously, we can also define the universal
robustness as
εuni(δ) = arg min
ε
ρuni(θ,S()) s.t. ρuni(θ,S()) > δ.
Here, a perturbation ξ with ||ξ||∞ < εuni(δ) exists that re-
sults in a misclassification rate of at least δ.
5.2. Quantifying Robustness
Since the exact evaluation of εuni(δ) is intractable for
our settings, we use an upper bound on the actual robustness
εuni(δ) instead. For this, we tuned the PGD adversary as
follows to make it more powerful (and thus the upper bound
more tight): we performed a binary search of b iterations
for perturbation magnitude ε of S(ε), i.e., the bound in the
l∞ norm on the perturbation, on the interval ε ∈ [0, 255].
In every iteration, we used the step-size annealing schedule
αk =
βεγk∑K−1
j=0 γ
j
which guarantees that
∑K−1
j=0 αk = βε.
If a perturbation with misclassification rate δ is found in an
iteration, the next iteration of binary search continues on the
lower half of the interval for ε, otherwise on the upper half.
The reported robustness is the smallest perturbation found
in entire procedure that achieves a misclassification rate of
δ. Note that this procedure was only used for evaluation; for
training we used a predefined ε and constant step-size αk.
6. Experimental Results
We present experimental results of shared adversarial
training on robustness against universal perturbations in
both image classification and semantic segmentation tasks.
We extended the PGD implementation of Cleverhans [34]
such that it supports shared adversarial perturbations and
loss clipping as discussed in Section 4. For quantifying
robustness, we extended Foolbox [39] such that universal
perturbations (with minimal l∞ norm) that achieve a mis-
classification rate of at least δ can be searched.
6.1. Experiments on CIFAR10
We present results on CIFAR10 [20] for ResNet20 [17]
with 64-128-256 feature maps per stage. For evaluating ro-
bustness, we generate funi using stochastic PGD on 5000
validation samples with mini-batches of size m˜k = 16 and
evaluated on 512 test samples. We used b = 10 binary
search iterations, K = 200 S-PGD iterations, and the step-
size schedule values γ = 0.975 and β = 4. We pretrained
ResNet20 with standard regularized empirical risk mini-
mization (ERM) and obtained an accuracy of 93.25% on
clean data and a robustness against universal perturbations
of εuni(δ = 0.75) = 14.9.
In general, we are interested in models that increase
the robustness without decreasing the accuracy on clean
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Figure 3. Pareto front on CIFAR10 for sharedness values s ∈ {1, 8, 64}. ERM corresponds to the model pretrained with empirical risk
minimization, “DeepFool UAD” [29] to models trained with the procedure proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [29], and “FictitiousPlay”
to the procedure proposed by Perolat et al. [37]. (Left) Robustness with regard to S-PGD universal perturbations. (Right) Robustness with
regard to DeepFool-based universal perturbations [29]. The Pareto front of the proposed defense is clearly above all previous defenses.
data considerably. We consider this as a multi-objective
problems with two objectives (accuracy and robustness).
In order to approximate the Pareto-front of different vari-
ants of adversarial and shared adversarial training (shared-
ness s ∈ {1, 8, 64}), we conducted runs for a range of
attack parameters: maximum perturbation strength ε ∈
{2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 14, 18, 22, 26} and σ ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}
(controlling the trade-off between expected and adversar-
ial risk). Model fine-tuning was performed with 65 epochs
of SGD with batch-size 128, momentum 0.9, initial learn-
ing rate of 0.0025 and also performed 4 steps of PGD with
step-size αk = 0.5ε for each mini-batch. Here, the learning
rate was annealed after 50 epochs by a factor of 10.
Figure 3 (left) shows the resulting Pareto fronts of differ-
ent sharedness values (entries are provided in Table A1 in
supplementary material). While sharedness s = 1 (standard
adversarial training) and s = 8 perform similarly, s = 64
strictly dominates the other two settings. Without any loss
on accuracy, a robustness of εuni(δ = 0.75) = 22.7 can
be achieved, and if one accepts an accuracy of 90%, a ro-
bustness of εuni(δ = 0.75) = 44.1 is obtainable. This cor-
responds to nearly three times the robustness of the unde-
fended model while accuracy only drops by less than 3.5%.
We would also like to note that standard adversarial train-
ing is surprisingly effective in defending against universal
perturbations and achieves a robustness that is smaller by
approximately 5 than s = 64 at the same level of accuracy
on unperturbed data. These findings suggest that increas-
ing sharedness results in increased robustness. We found in
preliminary experiments that this effect is strong for small s
but has diminishing returns for sharedness beyond s = 64.
We also evaluated the defenses against universal pertur-
bations proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [29] and Pero-
lat et al. [37] (please refer to Section A.3 in the supplemen-
tary material for details). It can be seen in Figure 3 (left)
that these defenses are strictly dominated by all variants
of (shared) adversarial training. In terms of computation,
shared adversarial training required 189s (the same compute
time as required by standard adversarial training) while the
defense [29] required 3118s, and the defense [37] required
3840s per epoch on average. The proposed method thus
outperforms the baseline defenses both in terms of compu-
tation and with regard to the robustness-accuracy trade-off.
Figure 3 (right) shows the Pareto front of the same mod-
els when attacked by the DeepFool-based method for gen-
erating universal perturbations [29]. In this case, the ro-
bustness is computed for a fixed perturbation magnitude
εuni = 20 and the accuracy δ under this perturbation is re-
ported. The qualitative results are the same as for an S-PGD
attack: the Pareto-front of adversarial training (s=1) clearly
dominates the results achieved by the defense proposed in
[29]. Moreover, shared adversarial training with s=64 domi-
nates standard adversarial training and the defense proposed
by Perolat et al. [37]. This indicates that the increased ro-
bustness by shared adversarial training is not specific to the
way the attacker generates universal perturbations. An illus-
tration of the universal perturbations on this dataset is given
in Section A.4 in the supplementary material.
6.2. Experiment on a Subset of ImageNet
We extend our experiments to a subset of ImageNet [9],
which has more classes and higher resolution inputs than
CIFAR10. Please refer to Section A.5 in the supplementary
material for details on the selection of this subset. Simi-
lar to CIFAR10, we evaluate the robustness using stochas-
tic PGD but generate perturbations on the training set with
mini-batches of size m˜k = 10, 000 and evaluate on the to-
tal validation set. We used b = 10 binary search iterations,
K = 20 S-PGD iterations, and the step-size schedule val-
ues γ = 0.975 and β = 4. We pre-trained wide resid-
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Figure 4. Pareto front on ImageNet for sharedness s ∈ {1, 32}.
Shared adversarial training has doubled the robustness at the point
of accuracy similar to baseline. With a slight loss of accuracy
between 5% to 7%, the method increases the robustness by a fac-
tor of 3 and clearly dominates the standard adversarial training in
terms of the robustness/accuracy trade-off.
ual network WRN-50-2-bottleneck [49] on this dataset with
ERM using SGD for 100 epochs along with initial learn-
ing rate 0.1 and reduced it by a factor of 10 after every 30
epochs. We have obtained a top-1 accuracy of 77.57% on
unperturbed validation data and a robustness against univer-
sal perturbations of εuni(δ = 0.75) = 8.4.
We approximate the Pareto front of adversarial and
shared adversarial training with sharedness s ∈ {1, 32}
and different ε ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 14, 18, 22, 26} and σ ∈
{0.5, 1.0}. We performed 5 steps of PGD with step-size
αk = 0.4ε. The model was fine-tuned for 30 epochs of
SGD with batch-size 128, momentum term 0.9, weight de-
cay 5e−5, an initial learning rate of 0.01 that was reduced
by a factor of 10 after 20 epochs and also performed 5 steps
of PGD with step-size αk = 0.4ε for each mini-batch.
Figure 4 compares the Pareto front of shared adversarial
training with s = 32 and standard adversarial training s = 1
(entries are provided in Table A2 in the supplementary ma-
terial). It can be clearly seen that shared adversarial train-
ing increases the robustness from εuni(δ = 0.75) = 8.4
to 15.0 without any loss of accuracy. Moreover, shared ad-
versarial training also dominates standard adversarial train-
ing for a target accuracy between 67%-74%, which corre-
sponds to the sweet spot as a small loss in accuracy allows
a large increase in robustness. The point with accuracy
72.74% and robustness εuni(δ = 0.75) = 25.64 (obtained
at s = 32, ε = 10, σ = 1.0) can be considered a good trade-
off as accuracy drops by only 5% while robustness increases
by a factor of 3, which results in clearly perceptible pertur-
bations as shown in the top row of Figure 1 and Section
A.6. Moreover, (shared) adversarial training also increases
the entropy of the predicted class distribution for successful
untargeted perturbations substantially (see Section A.7).
6.3. Semantic Image Segmentation
The results from above experiments show that shared ad-
versarial training improves robustness against universal per-
turbations on image classification tasks where the adversary
aims to fool the classifier’s single decision on an input. In
this section, we investigate our method against adversaries
in a dense prediction task (semantic image segmentation),
where the adversary aims at fooling the classifier on many
decisions. To our knowledge, this is the first work to scale
defenses based on adversarial training to this task.
We evaluate the proposed method on the Cityscapes
dataset [8]. For computational reasons, all images and la-
bels were downsampled from a resolution of 2048 × 1024
to 1024 × 512 pixels, where for images a bilinear interpo-
lation and for labels a nearest-neighbor approach was used
for downsampling. We pretrained the FCN-8 network archi-
tecture [24] on the whole training set of 2975 images and
achieved 49.3% class-wise intersection-over-union (IoU)
on the validation set of 500 images. Note that this IoU is
relatively low because of downsampling the images.
We follow the experimental setup of Metzen et al. [27]
which performed a targeted attack with a fixed target scene
(monchengladbach 000000 026602 gtFine). They demon-
strated that the desired target segmentation can be achieved
despite the fact that the original scene has nothing in com-
mon with the target scene. We use the same target scene
and consider this targeted attack successful if the average
pixel-wise accuracy between the prediction on the perturbed
images and the target segmentation exceeds δ = 0.95.
For evaluating robustness, we generate funi using stochas-
tic PGD with mini-batches from the validation set of size
m˜k = 5 and tested on 16 samples from test set. We used
b = 10 binary search iterations,K = 200 S-PGD iterations,
the step-size schedule values γ = 0.99 and β = 2, and did
not employ loss thresholding for targeted attacks. We find
a universal perturbation that upper bounds the robustness of
the model to εuni(δ = 0.95) ≤ 19.92.
We fine-tuned this model with adversarial and shared ad-
versarial training. Since approximating the entire Pareto
front of both methods would be computationally very ex-
pensive, we instead selected a target performance on unper-
turbed data of roughly 45% IoU (no more than 5% worse
than the undefended model). The following two settings
achieved this target performance (see Figure 5 left): adver-
sarial training with ε = 8 and σ = 0.5 and shared adversar-
ial training for sharedness s = 5, ε = 30, and σ = 0.7. The
finetuning was performed for 20 epochs using Adam with
batch-size 5 and a learning rate of 0.0001 that was annealed
after 15 epochs to 0.00001. As heap adversary, we per-
formed 5 steps of untargeted PGD with step-size αk = 0.4ε.
While both methods achieved very similar performance
on unperturbed data, they show very different robustness
against adversarial and universal perturbations (see Figure
5): standard adversarial training largely increases robust-
ness against adversarial perturbations to εadv(δ = 0.95) ≤
11, an increase by a factor of 4 compared to the unde-
fended model. Shared adversarial training is less effec-
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Figure 5. Learning curves on Cityscapes for adversarial (red, cir-
cle) and shared adversarial training (blue, diamond) with regard to
performance on unperturbed images (left), and robustness against
adversarial perturbations (middle, showing mean and standard er-
ror of mean) and universal perturbations (right). Black horizontal
lines denote performance of undefended model. Isolated markers
correspond to robustness against untargeted attacks. Performance
of both standard and shared adversarial training are comparable
on unperturbed data, but standard adversarial training dominates
in terms of robustness against image-dependent adversarial per-
turbations, while shared adversarial training dominates in terms of
robustness against targeted and untargeted universal perturbations.
tive against adversarial perturbations, its robustness is up-
per bounded by εadv(δ = 0.95) ≤ 5.9. However, shared
adversarial training is more effective against targeted uni-
versal perturbations with an upper bound on robustness of
εuni(δ = 0.95) ≤ 111.7, while adversarial training reaches
εuni(δ = 0.95) ≤ 62.5.
We also evaluated robustness against untargeted attacks:
robustness increased from εuni(δ = 0.95) ≤ 8.5 of the un-
defended model to 25 and 47.8 for the models trained with
standard and shared adversarial training respectively. The
universal perturbation for the model trained with shared ad-
versarial training clearly shows patterns of the target scene
and dominates the original image, which is also depicted
in the bottom row of Figure 1. We refer to Section A.8 in
the supplementary material for illustrations of targeted and
untargeted universal perturbations for different models.
6.4. Discussion
Results shown in Figure 5 indicate that there may exist
a trade-off between robustness against image-dependent ad-
versarial perturbations and universal perturbations. Figure 6
illustrates why these two kinds of robustness are not strictly
related: adversarial perturbations fool a classifier by both
adding structure from the target scene/class2 to the image
(e.g., vegetation on the middle left part of the image) and
by destroying properties of the original scene (e.g., edges of
the topmost windowsills). The latter is not possible for uni-
versal perturbations since the input images are not known
in advance. As also shown in the figure, universal pertur-
bations compensate this by adding stronger patterns of the
target scene. Shared perturbations will become more similar
2For untargeted attacks, the attacks may choose a target scene/class
arbitrarily such that fooling the model becomes as simple as possible.
Figure 6. Illustration of image-dependent and universal perturba-
tions for the same image and target scene (upper and lower left)
that are generated on the model hardened with shared adversarial
training. Image-dependent perturbations weaken patterns of exist-
ing structure like edges of the actual scene (upper right) whereas
universal perturbations are restricted to adding structure indicative
of the target scene (lower right). This qualitative difference be-
tween perturbations provides a possible explanation why shared
adversarial training demonstrates different levels of robustness on
image-dependent and universal perturbations: shared adversarial
training improves robustnesss against additive structure but not
against the perturbations that weaken the existing structure.
to universal perturbations with increasing sharedness since
a single shared perturbation has fixed capacity and cannot
destroy properties of arbitrarily many input images (even if
they are known in advance). Accordingly, shared adversar-
ial training will make the model mostly more robust against
perturbations which add new structures and not against per-
turbations which destroy existing structure. Hence, it results
in less robustness against image-specific perturbations (seen
in Figure 5 middle). On the other hand, since shared adver-
sarial training focuses on one specific kind of perturbations
(those that add structure to the scene), it leads to models
that are particularly robust against universal perturbations
(shown in Figure 5 right).
7. Conclusion
We have shown that adversarial training is surprisingly
effective in defending against universal perturbations. Since
adversarial training does not explicitly optimize the trade-
off between robustness against universal perturbations and
performance on unperturbed data points, it handles this
trade-off suboptimally. We have proposed shared adver-
sarial training, which performs adversarial training on a
tight upper bound of the universal adversarial risk. We
have shown that our method allows achieving high robust-
ness against universal perturbations on image classification
tasks at smaller loss of accuracy. The proposed method also
scales to semantic segmentation on high resolution images,
where compared to adversarial training it achieves higher
robustness against universal perturbations at the same level
of performance on unperturbed images.
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Defending Against Universal Perturbations With Shared Adversarial Training
A. Supplementary material
A.1. Threat Model
Here, we specify the capabilities of the adversary since the proposed defense mechanism aims at providing security under
a specific threat model. We assume a white-box setting, where the adversary has full information about the model, i.e.,
it knows network architecture and weights, and can provide arbitrary inputs to the model and observe their corresponding
outputs (and loss gradients). Moreover, we assume that the attacker can arbitrarily modify every pixel of the input but aims
at keeping the l∞ norm of this perturbation minimal. In the case of a universal perturbation, we assume that the attacker
can choose an arbitrary perturbation (while aiming to keep the l∞ norm minimal), but crucially does not know the inputs to
which this perturbation will be applied. The adversary, however, has access to data points that have been sampled from the
same data distribution as the future inputs.
A.2. Relationship of different sharedness
Provided that the heap adversary finds a perturbation that is sufficiently close to the optimal perturbation of the heap and
that heaps are composed hierarchically1, we have the following relationship for s = 2i (we omit the dependence on σ, S and
fadv/fheap/funi for brevity):
ρ˜adv = ρ˜
(1)
heap ≥ ρ˜(2)heap ≥ ρ˜(4)heap ≥ · · · ≥ ρ˜(d)heap ≥ ρ˜uni(σ,S)
To see ρ˜(s)heap ≥ ρ˜(2s)heap, let ξ1, . . . , ξd/(2s) be the shared perturbations on the d/(2s) heaps of ρ˜(2s)heap. Let ξj be the shared
perturbation for the j-th heap. Then, because of the hierarchical construction of the heaps, this heap is composed of two
heaps used in ρ˜(s)heap. Let j1 and j2 be the corresponding indices of these heaps in ρ˜
(s)
heap. By setting ξj1 = ξj2 = ξj , we obtain
ρ˜
(s)
heap = ρ˜
(2s)
heap.
A.3. Configuration of Baselines for CIFAR10
For the defense proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [29], we generated 10 different universal perturbations using the
DeepFool-based method for generating universal-perturbations on 10,000 randomly sampled training images, ran 5 epochs of
adversarial training with σ = 0.5, and chose the applied perturbation uniform randomly from the precomputed perturbations.
After these 5 epochs, the robustness was evaluated. This procedure was iterated five times, which resulted in 5 accuracy-
robustness points in Figure 1.
We run the defense proposed by Perolat et al. [37] for 45 epochs (sufficiently long for achieving convergence as evidenced
by Figure 4 of Perolat et al. [37]). At the beginning of each episode, we generated one universal perturbation using the
DeepFool-based method for generating universal-perturbations on the entire training set. We used σ = 0.25, and chose
the applied perturbation uniform randomly from all universal perturbations computed so far. We report the accuracy and
robustness at the end of these 45 epochs. We note that even though we did not replicate the exact setup of Perolat et al. [37],
we achieve a similar accuracy-robustness trade-off in Figure 3 (right) as the one given in Figure 4 of Perolat et al. [37].
A.4. Illustration of Universal Perturbations on CIFAR10
Figure A1 illustrates the minimal universal perturbation found for sharedness s = 1 and s = 64 for σ = 0.3 and
ε ∈ {2, 8, 14, 18, 26}. Universal perturbations of the undefended model resemble high-frequency noise and are quasi-
imperceptible when added to an image. Shared adversarial training increases robustness and the resulting perturbations are
more perceptible (for small ε) or even dominate the image: for larger ε, the cat in the figure is completely hidden and the
perturbed image could also not be classified correctly by a human. Moreover, the perturbation becomes more structured
and even object-like for larger ε. Note that the perturbations shown for s = 1 also achieve high robustness but for smaller
accuracy on clean data than those of shared adversarial training with s = 64.
1Heaps are composed hierarchically when a heap of sharedness 2s is always the union of two disjoint heaps of sharedness s.
A.5. Selection of subset of ImageNet
Since the generation of the Pareto fronts on the entire ImageNet dataset would be computationally very expensive, we
restrict the experiment to a subset of ImageNet. We use classes defined in TinyImageNet to filter out the samples from
ImageNet dataset. We conducted our experiments on the samples of 200 classes from ImageNet, which results in 258,601
train and 10,000 validation images. Note that we take only the list of classes defined from TinyImageNet and use the data of
those classes from ImageNet dataset with original resolution.
A.6. Illustration of Universal Perturbations on ImageNet
We depict the universal perturbations with minimum magnitude on different models that are obtained from settings σ =
1.0, sharedness s ∈ {1, 32} and different values of ε on the subset of ImageNet in Figure A2. It can be clearly seen that both
the standard (s = 1) and shared adversarial training (s = 32) increase robustness when compared against the undefended
model but the latter handles the trade-off between performance on unperturbed data and robustness more gracefully. The
universal perturbations become clearly visible on a model hardened with shared adversarial training with only a marginal
loss of 5% in top-1 accuracy and perturbations become much smoother for larger ε.
A.7. Predicted Class after Untargeted Universal Perturbations
Figure A3 shows which class is predicted on ImageNet validation data after an untargeted universal perturbation (for the
respective model) is added. While the undefended model predicts nearly always the same (wrong) class, the models defended
with standard and shared adversarial training have a substantially higher entropy in their predictions. Prior work [18] has also
observed that undefended models typically misclassify images perturbed with universal perturbation to the same class even
though the attack is untargeted. Based on this observation, they hypothesized that directions in which a classifier is vulnerable
to universal perturbations coincide with directions important for correct prediction on unperturbed data. We believe it would
be important to re-examine these results for a defended model.
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Figure A1. Illustration of universal perturbations on CIFAR10 for sharedness s = 1 (top row) and s = 64 (middle row) for different values
of ε. The bottom row shows a test image of a cat with the respective perturbation of the middle row being added.
A.8. Attacks on Semantic Image Segmentation
We illustrate universal perturbations for targeted and untargeted attacks on different models in this section. We illustrate
the effect of the perturbations on one image; however, the perturbations are not specific for this image. For the model trained
with empirical risk minimization, Figure A4 shows a targeted attack and Figure A5 an untargeted attack. For the model
trained with adversarial training, Figure A6 shows a targeted attack and Figure A8 an untargeted attack. For the model
trained with shared adversarial training, Figure A7 shows a targeted attack and Figure A9 an untargeted attack. We also
illustrate the universal perturbations found for different models on targeted attacks in Figure A10.
Figure A2. Illustration of universal perturbations (not amplified) on ImageNet that are generated from different models with the settings:
sharedness s = 1 (top row) and s = 32 (third row), σ = 1.0 and different values of ε. The top-1 accuracy of the corresponding models
and their smallest perturbation magnitude ε that results in a misclassification rate of atleast 75% are also shown. The second and bottom
rows show a test image of a dog added with the respective universal perturbations from the first and third row. The models hardened
with both standard and shared adversarial training demonstrate higher robustness when compared against the undefended model and
universal perturbations become clearly visible. However, the shared adversarial training outperforms its counterpart in terms of robustness
against perturbations and performance on unperturbed inputs. The perturbation of models from standard adversarial training resemble high
frequency noise whereas the perturbations of the latter becomes much smoother for larger ε.
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Figure A3. The figure shows histogram of the predicted classes over validation data of different models when an untargeted universal
perturbation is added. The histogram is based on 200 classes ImageNet validation data. In other words, a bar in each histogram represents
the number of times a class (represented by class index) is predicted over the validation samples. It is interesting to note that the undefended
model almost always misclassified the adversarial samples (samples added with universal perturbations) under the same class even though
attack is untargeted. In contrast, the defended models from standard and shared adversarial training have higher entropy in their predictions.
Figure A4. Targeted universal perturbations on Cityscapes for a model pretrained with empirical risk minimization. The shown perturbation
upper bounds the robustness of the model to εuni(δ = 0.95) ≤ 19.89. Top row shows original image, universal perturbation, and perturbed
image. Bottom row shows prediction on original image, target segmentation, and prediction on perturbed image.
Figure A5. Untargeted universal perturbations on Cityscapes for a model pretrained with empirical risk minimization. The shown pertur-
bation upper bounds the robustness of the model to εuni(δ = 0.95) ≤ 8.5. Top row shows original image, universal perturbation, and
perturbed image. Bottom row shows prediction on original image and prediction on perturbed image.
Figure A6. Targeted universal perturbations on Cityscapes for a model trained with adversarial training. The shown perturbation upper
bounds the robustness of the model to εuni(δ = 0.95) ≤ 62.5. Top row shows original image, universal perturbation, and perturbed
image. Bottom row shows prediction on original image, target segmentation, and prediction on perturbed image.
Figure A7. Universal perturbations on Cityscapes for a model trained with shared adversarial training. The shown perturbation upper
bounds the robustness of the model to εuni(δ = 0.95) ≤ 111.7. Top row shows original image, universal perturbation, and perturbed
image. Bottom row shows prediction on original image, target segmentation, and prediction on perturbed image.
Figure A8. Untargeted universal perturbations on Cityscapes for a model trained with adversarial training. The shown perturbation upper
bounds the robustness of the model to εuni(δ = 0.95) ≤ 25. Top row shows original image, universal perturbation, and perturbed image.
Bottom row shows prediction on original image and prediction on perturbed image.
Figure A9. Untargeted universal perturbations on Cityscapes for a model trained with shared adversarial training. The shown perturbation
upper bounds the robustness of the model to εuni(δ = 0.95) ≤ 47.8. Top row shows original image, universal perturbation, and perturbed
image. Bottom row shows prediction on original image, target segmentation, and prediction on perturbed image.
Table A1. Universal robustness and classification accuracy of ResNet20 trained with standard adversarial training (s = 1) and shared
adversarial training s ∈ {8, 64} against S-PGD universal perturbations on CIFAR10 under different range of attack parameters ε and
σ. The pictorial representation of these entries are depicted in Figure 3 (left). The bold entries represent the model trained with shared
adversarial training s = 64 that yields threefold increase in robustness when compared to undefended model with a drop of less than 3.5%
in accuracy.
σ s ε = 2 ε = 4 ε = 6 ε = 8 ε = 10 ε = 14 ε = 18 ε = 22 ε = 26
0.3 1 Acc.(%)
92.16 90.42 88.76 84.02 78.54 73.61 70.32 67.63 61.73
εuni(δ = 0.75) 28.14 33.62 34.37 40.59 38.85 41.59 56.03 48.06 48.06
8 Acc.(%)
93.04 92.05 91.34 90.75 89.09 85.87 82.68 79.69 76.35
εuni(δ = 0.75) 23.41 26.89 32.62 34.12 32.87 40.59 45.82 47.31 54.54
64 Acc.(%)
93.72 93.36 92.84 92.47 91.90 90.89 88.93 86.13 83.89
εuni(δ = 0.75) 19.42 22.66 25.90 27.89 32.37 39.10 40.34 42.58 46.32
0.5 1 Acc.(%)
91.77 89.70 87.60 85.44 82.64 71.81 66.61 64.46 62.16
εuni(δ = 0.75) 30.63 38.10 39.35 42.33 47.31 61.26 55.78 93.27 63.75
8 Acc.(%)
92.62 91.69 90.86 90.11 89.04 86.16 82.92 80.54 75.99
εuni(δ = 0.75) 23.16 29.88 33.87 36.61 38.10 42.83 43.83 53.54 64.00
64 Acc.(%)
93.55 93.09 92.50 91.99 91.62 90.58 88.52 86.65 84.13
εuni(δ = 0.75) 20.67 23.91 28.14 29.88 38.10 37.60 41.34 47.31 51.05
0.7 1 Acc.(%)
91.55 89.07 86.58 84.47 81.97 78.75 73.29 64.15 63.63
εuni(δ = 0.75) 31.63 42.08 39.84 45.82 46.82 54.04 63.75 95.63 89.65
8 Acc.(%)
92.51 91.29 90.23 89.12 88.08 85.70 83.74 80.27 78.00
εuni(δ = 0.75) 26.40 30.38 35.11 39.84 44.08 45.07 45.82 50.55 54.54
64 Acc.(%)
93.34 92.81 92.27 91.67 91.30 89.94 88.25 85.96 83.94
εuni(δ = 0.75) 20.67 23.91 27.89 30.88 36.11 44.08 43.58 51.05 50.80
0.9 1 Acc.(%)
91.45 88.54 85.51 82.97 80.38 76.35 72.94 70.14 68.20
εuni(δ = 0.75) 32.87 38.85 46.07 50.55 54.54 58.27 63.25 64.50 59.77
8 Acc.(%)
92.27 90.97 89.89 88.63 86.89 84.25 81.63 79.13 76.56
εuni(δ = 0.75) 26.40 33.12 37.10 40.34 44.08 45.82 47.81 55.28 58.02
64 Acc.(%)
93.18 92.61 92.12 91.42 90.85 89.32 87.41 85.26 83.10
εuni(δ = 0.75) 22.16 25.40 29.63 32.87 36.61 43.33 46.07 45.32 54.04
Figure A10. Illustration of targeted universal perturbation for empirical risk minimization (top), adversarial training (middle), and shared
adversarial training (bottom).
Table A2. Universal robustness and classification accuracy of WRN-50-2-bottleneck trained with standard adversarial training (s = 1) and
shared adversarial training (s = 32) against S-PGD universal perturbations on a subset of ImageNet (200 classes) under different range
of attack parameters ε and σ. The pictorial representation of these entries are depicted in Figure 4. The bold entries represent the model
trained with shared adversarial training s = 32 that yields threefold increase in robustness when compared to undefended model with a
drop of less than 5% in accuracy.
σ s ε = 2 ε = 4 ε = 6 ε = 8 ε = 10 ε = 14 ε = 18 ε = 22 ε = 26
0.5 1 Acc.(%)
75.81 74.49 71.14 71.48 68.78 66.25 64.05 59.04 57.54
εuni(δ = 0.75) 17.92 18.92 23.90 17.92 13.94 20.66 20.41 29.38 25.89
32 Acc.(%)
77.50 77.23 75.46 72.77 68.43 64.21 56.48 54.58 48.30
εuni(δ = 0.75) 13.44 15.93 17.43 12.70 18.67 28.13 33.36 43.33 45.57
1.0 1 Acc.(%)
74.83 71.84 67.79 66.72 63.51 60.38 58.49 57.23 55.19
εuni(δ = 0.75) 20.17 23.90 24.90 28.88 27.89 30.13 30.62 32.12 32.37
32 Acc.(%)
77.41 76.41 75.22 73.86 72.74 70.04 66.97 62.36 56.99
εuni(δ = 0.75) 14.94 17.43 19.67 21.41 25.64 28.88 30.13 29.38 33.36
